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Arrest First, Ask Questions Later: The
Japanese Police Detention System
I. Introduction
Imagine for the next few moments that you have just been ar-
rested by the police as a suspect for a criminal offense. You have
been taken to the police station where you will remain for the next
twenty-three days without a formal criminal charge filed against
you. During your incarceration you will be subjected to relentless
interrogation periods which last for over ten hours a day, and run
late into the evening hours.1 These interrogation periods have been
designed to coerce a confession from you, whether you have actually
committed the crime or not. Interrogation techniques may include
the bartering of "privileges" such as water, food or bathroom visits; 2
other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;3 or perhaps
even violence." During this time, if you are fortunate, you will be
permitted to meet with an attorney, for two fifteen-minute visits.,
Has this hypothetical situation placed you in a totalitarian
state? Or in a country in a state of emergency where civil and politi-
cal rights have been suspended? No, for the past few moments, you
have been a suspect held under the police detention system of Japan,
one of the most technologically advanced democracies in the world
today.
Japan's Prison Law of 1908 authorized the. detention of suspects
in police station cells.' The Japanese police detention system has
been the subject of criticism in Japan, however, little is known about
the Japanese criminal justice system and the police detention system
abroad. A new bill which would permit the present police detention
system to continue was submitted to the Japanese Legislature during
the summer of 1988.7 The bill has served to increase the focus on the
system in Japan and abroad.
1. See K. Itoh, Report Concerning Present Status of Human Rights in Japan 8, 9 (June
1988) [hereinafter JCLU Report] (available through the Japan Civil Liberties Union, 306
Atagoyama Bengoshi Bldg., 1-6-7, Atago. Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan).
2. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 91-92.
3. See Chira, Secrets of Police Cell: Woman's Grim Story, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1988,
at A4, col. 4. See also infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
4. See JCLU Report supra note 1, at 9. See also infra text accompanying notes 94-95.
5. Itoh, On Publication of the "Citizens" Human Rights Reports 20 LAW IN JAPAN 29
(1987) [hereinafter Itoh].
6. See supra note 3, at col. 3.
7. id.
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The purpose of this Comment is to explore more fully the Japa-
nese police detention system. This Comment presents an overview of
the Japanese criminal justice system, discussing the social and proce-
dural context in which the police detention system exists. Next, gen-
eral treatment of suspects and specific abuses under the police deten-
tion system is explained. Further, the applicability of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights8 to human rights problems in Japan is
analyzed and specific provisions of the Covenant are applied to the
problems presented by the police detention system. Finally, a propo-
sal for change in the system to remedy human rights abuses is
discussed.
II. The Japanese Criminal Justice System: An Overview
A. Crime and Japanese Society
In order to understand the human rights problems presented by
the Japanese Police Detention System, it is necessary to survey the
Japanese criminal justice system. Japan has been noted throughout
the world for its extremely low crime rates.9 Many commentators
believe that the reason Japanese crime rates have been so low is be-
cause of the existence of informal social controls.1" Since ancient
times, Japanese society has been hierarchial, the society's norms and
mores subject the individual to the needs of the entire group. To-
day, Japan's "intricate, rigid and ancient norms and mores exist side
by side with an open-minded and cosmopolitan life-style."'" As such,
in Japanese society, affiliation with a group is still of primary impor-
tance. The Japanese tend to act with the group in mind; there is
typically strong commitment to uphold the honor of one's family,
school class, employer, political party and nation. 3
The individual is very wary of committing an act which may
cause a loss of prestige, or "face" to any groups to which the individ-
ual belongs."' "By committing a crime, a Japanese not only loses
8. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter COVENANT ON CIVIL AND PO-
LITICAL RIGHTS] reprinted in R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
170.1-180.1 (1983) [hereinafter R. LILLICH].
9. See generally M. STANDISH & L. VILLALON, TOKYO: ONE CITY WHERE CRIME
DOESN'T PAY (1975) [hereinafter M. STANDISH & L. VILLALON]; D. BAYLEY, FORCES OF OR-
DER (1976) [hereinafter D. BAYLEY]; Araki, The Flow of Criminal Cases in the Japanese
Criminal Justice System, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 601 (1985) [hereinafter Araki].
10. See generally, F. ALDER. NATIONS NOT OBSESSED WITH CRIME (1983) [hereinafter
F. ALDER]; W. AMES, POLICE AND COMMUNITY IN JAPAN (1981); D. BAYLEY, supra note 9; M.
STANDISH & L. VILLALON, supra note 9; Haley, Law and Society in Contemporary Japan:
American Perspectives, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 1 (1984).
11. F. ALDER, supra note 10, at 96.
12. Id. at 95.
13. Id. at 96. See also M. STANDISH & L. VILLALON, supra note 9, at 13.
14. M. STANDISH & L. VILLALON, supra note 9, at 13.
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"face" for himself or herself but also for a senior, whether a parent
or employer. An action which brings loss of "face" inevitably results
in expulsion from the social structure of which the individual is so
essentially a part." 15 Further, with its extremely dense population,
houses are built close together on narrow streets in Japan, and there-
fore informal social controls work well because deviant behavior is
difficult to hide. 16
The extensive use of apology for misconduct rather than legal
sanction provides another social control in Japan. 7 The Japanese po-
lice often adjust their reaction to misconduct based on the repen-
tance of the individual.'" An apology serves as more than an admis-
sion of guilt; it is a promise to refrain from committing the offense
again. 9 Among the Japanese people there are strong ethical norms
that require people to acknowledge their guilt.20 Thus, the use and
acceptance of apology points to two characteristics of Japanese soci-
ety. First, the Japanese police possess a great amount of discretion
when dealing with criminal suspects and second, the Japanese peo-
ple, as a societal unit, are willing to accept authority and cooperate
with police.
Another relevant and unique characteristic of the Japanese
criminal justice system is the frequency of confessions of guilt. The
confessions of suspects play an important role in the criminal justice
system in Japan. It is important, therefore, to study its role in an
effort to appreciate the potential for abuse of obtaining confessions
in the police detention system. Confessions are similar to apologies to
the extent that "Japanese offenders are more willing than Americans
to throw themselves on the mercy of policemen, prosecutors, and
judges because reconciliation is considered a more important objec-
tive of legal process than vindication."'" As stated previously, repen-
tance, which can be shown by compliance with authority, often has
the effect of lessening punishment. Thus, through compliance, sus-
pects sometimes calculatingly seek leniency and less severe punish-
ments.22 Further, "Japanese policemen and prosecutors not only ex-
pect suspects to confess their misdeeds, they act in such a way as to
reinforce that norm."23
Not only are citizens under a moral obligation to confess in Jap-
anese society, but discovery of an involuntary confession does not
15. Id.
16. F. ALDER, supra note 10, at 98.
17. D. BAYLEY, supra note 9, at 134-40. See generally Haley, supra note 10, at 2.
18 D. BAYLEY, supra note 9, at 134.
19. Id. at 139.
20. Id. at 138.
21. Id. at 148.
22. Id. at 150.
23. Id. at 149-50. See generally infra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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affect a case as it would in the United States. In the United States, a
confession which was given involuntarily is inadmissible at trial.2" In
Japan, however, "not only may the prosecution continue on other
grounds, but the judge need not throw out the entire confessions.
The judge has the discretion to decide for himself whether specific
items in the confession are likely to be true even if other parts are
not." 5
The potential for abuse in the area of involuntary confessions is
obvious. On one hand, among the Japanese people there exists a
"psychological compulsion to confess." 26 Further, with a conviction
rate of over 99 percent in criminal cases in recent years,2 7 the inno-
cent criminal suspect may feel his only chance at decreasing his pun-
ishment is to confess even to a crime he did not commit. On the
other hand, the police and prosecutors know that a confession may
still be upheld as valid by the courts even though it was obtained
involuntarily.
Both the police and people of Japan must be commended on the
low crime rate in their country. Informal social controls play an es-
sential role in keeping the crime rate so low. The Japanese police
have skillfully observed these social controls, and have used them
effectively in fighting crime. Because, however, the social control of
confessions is so ingrained in Japanese culture, the police must take
care not to abuse it. The laws of criminal procedure play an impor-
tant role in preventing such abuse.
24. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), where the U.S. Supreme Court
stated:
Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and unless
other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right to silence
and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the
following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity
to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to an-
swer questions or make a statement.- But unless and until such warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against him.
Id. at 478-79.
25. D. BAYLEY, supra note 9, at 152.
26. Id. at 153.
27. Repeta, The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and Human
Rights in Japan, 20 LAW IN JAPAN 1 (1987) [hereinafter Repeta]. The high conviction rate
prompted a prominent professor of Japanese law to ask: "Focusing on a conviction rate which
has gotten this high, we must finally ask: Just what does the defense do? If 99.8 percent really
are guilty, if that figure is correct, maybe we don't need criminal lawyers." Id. at 14.
See also Araki, supra note 9, at 601: "Only a small handful-less than 10%-of the
cases processed in Japanese courts are seriously contested. In the vast bulk of cases the ac-
cused is convicted largely upon his or her own confession."
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B. Criminal Procedure in Japan
1. Arrest.-Most cases enter the Japanese criminal system
through arrest by police. 8 The Public Prosecutor's Office establishes
a set of lesser crimes in which police may release suspects upon a
showing of restitution and apology.29 The prosecutors may also initi-
ate cases by conducting investigations and arrests, but they usually
do so only in cases of political significance or complexity.
There are three possibilities at the initial stage of the Japanese
criminal justice system. First, a suspect may be arrested (by the po-
lice or the prosecutor) and taken to the police station to await a
detention determination; second, the suspect may only be cited as
liable for future prosecution or; third, the suspect may be discharged
by the police because of the triviality of the offense and because the
suspect has made restitution to the victim.30
2. Detention.31-- Once a decision is made by the police to ar-
rest and detain a suspect, the police must bring the suspect to the
prosecutor's office within 48 hours after arrest, unless they decide
after questioning that detention is unnecessary. 2 Within 72 hours of
arrest, the prosecutor must decide whether to indict the suspect
(thus instituting prosecution immediately), release the suspect,33 or
make a request for detention. 4
If the prosecutor chooses to make a request for detention, the
request must be submitted to a judge.35 The judge may issue a writ
of detention if he finds that
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused
has committed the crime, and that the accused falls under one
of the following categories: (1) the accused has no fixed dwell-
ing, (2) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused
may destroy evidence, or (3) the accused has escaped or there
are reasonable grounds to suspect that he may escape (Keiji
Shosho Ho (Code of Criminal Procedure) art. 60 § I)."
While the above criteria appear narrow for the extension of de-
28. Araki, supra note 9, at 607.
29. Id. at 610; see also supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
30. Araki, supra note 9, at 611; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
3 1. This section will discuss the simple mechanics of the detention system. See infra text
accompanying notes 50-96.
32. Id.
33. Araki, supra note 9, at 612.
34. Id. at 629. At this point suspects are usually released "because the offense is consid-
ered to be too trivial, because there is a problem with the complaint, or some other reason
unrelated to insufficient evidence." Id. In the United States most cases are dropped for eviden-
tiary reasons. Id.
35. Id. at 613; see also Itoh, supra note 5, at 52.
36. Id. at 64.
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tention, when they are applied in practice the criteria are not so nar-
rowly construed. An overwhelming majority of detention requests are
granted by judges."7
Upon approval from the judge, the length of the first detention
is ten days from the time the prosecution petitioned the court for the
writ of detention. 8 The detention period may be extended another
ten days upon request of the prosecutor. 9 Suspects, therefore, may
be detained for a total of 23 days in absence of a formal charge
against them. After a suspect is indicted under a criminal charge,
the prosecutor often has all the detention time he desires,4" because
suspects are seldom released on bail."
3. Prosecution and Trial.-Prosecutors in Japan are part of a
nationalized system. Unlike the United States, there are no state or
federal divisions, and Japanese procedures are standard throughout
the country.' Japanese prosecutors are unique because of their very
broad discretionary power either to initiate prosecutions or to dis-
charge the suspect."3 The prosecutor may discharge the suspect by
either nonprosecution,"' or suspension of prosecution.' 5
Once the prosecutor has decided to pursue the case, by indicting
the suspect, he has a choice of either bringing the case before a sum-
mary procedure or to trial. In a summary procedure, the prosecutor
"makes an in camera determination of the suspect's guilt and im-
poses a fine of no more than 200,000 yen (about $1000), or a minor
fine.""' Neither party appears before a court, but either party may
appeal the judge's decision of the summary procedure within four-
teen days. Most criminal cases are disposed of in this manner.
37. Araki, supra note 9, at 612.
38. Itoh, supra note 5, at 65. Of the 101,969 requests for detention made in 1982,
101,202 requests were granted, 744 were rejected and 23 were withdrawn. Id. Therefore, at
this initial stage, judges approve the prosecutor's request for detention in 99.24 percent of the
cases. Id.
39. Araki, supra note 9, at 612.
40. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (keiji sosho ho) [hereinafter CODE OF CRIM.
PROC.[ art. 208. When the crime involves insurrection, foreign aggression, foreign relations, or
riot, the judge may extend the term an additional five days. See also Araki, supra note 9, at
612 n.1 1.
40. Id. at 612.
41. See generally Repeta, supra note 27, at 16-17; Itoh, supra note 5, at 65-73.
42. Araki, supra note 9, at 611.
43. Id. at 615. See generally, George, Discretionary Authority of Public Prosecutors in
Japan, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 42 (1984).
44. Araki, supra note 9, at 611. The prosecutor may suspend a case through nonp-
rosecution if he finds that there is insufficient evidence, lack or defect in the complaint or a
case of insanity. Id.
45. Id. The prosecutor may discharge a case also under article 248 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure which states: "If after considering the character, age, situation of the offender,
the gravity of the offense, the circumstances under which the condition subsequent to the com-
mission of the offense, prosecution is deemed unnecessary, prosecution may not be instituted."
CODE OF CRIM. PROC., supra note 39, at art. 248.
46. Araki, supra note 9, at 619.
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Cases that go to trial are typically those that the prosecutor
found to be too important to handle through summary procedure. In
Japan, complex case trials are often comprised of separate hearings
held at long intervals, thus a final decision in a complex case may
not be rendered for many years."7 There are no jury trials in Japan.
The general rule is that one judge presides over the court and gives
the decision. In serious cases such as murder, robbery or rape, how-
ever, a three judge panel often presides.48 The acquittal rate in trials
during 1987 was less than one percent.49
III. A Closer Look at the Japanese Police Detention System
A. Description
After a Japanese prosecutor has made the decision to detain a
criminal suspect, he must file a request with a judge within 72 hours
of the suspect's arrest. The prosecutor at this time will also suggest a
detention location for the suspect. The prosecutor, in almost all
cases, will request a police detention facility (Daiyo Kargoku) in an
effort to "guarantee convenient police investigation."50 The use of
police detention cells rather than one of the 113 Detention Centers
run by the Ministry of Justice has been permitted since the passage
of the Prison Law of 1908.51 Judges are willing to allow the deten-
tion of suspects in police detention facilities because there are many
more police facilities (1,267) than Detention Centers (113). More
importantly, however, "judges seem to be unwilling to oppose the
prosecutor's recommendation and hinder the convenience of the
investigation.' 52
Observers in Japan have noted that arrest is just the beginning
of the criminal investigation. 3 The police and the prosecutor use the
suspect's detention time to build their case. The police and prosecu-
tors view the suspect as the center of the investigation, often relying
on the suspect's confession, rather than extrinsic evidence discovered
through investigative skill. 4 This practice is significantly different
than in the United States, where arrest usually occurs after an ex-
tensive investigation reveals that there is enough evidence to indict
the suspect.55 Thus, in Japan, criminal suspects are often detained
47. Repeta, supra note 27, at 16-17.
48. Araki, supra note 9, at 621.
49. Repeta, supra note 27, at 14.
50. Araki, supra note 9, at 613.
51. JCLU Report, supra note 1, at 9.
52. Araki, supra note 9, at 614-15.
53. See supra note 3, at col. 4.
54. Id.
55. Toshikuni Murai, professor of criminal law at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo
stated: "in principle, arresting a person should be the final step after collecting evidence. In
the United States, when the police arrest a person, there is usually enough proof to indict him.
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for up to 23 days, without formal charges against them, usually in
the custody of the same police officials who are responsible for the
investigation. The temptation of police officials to coerce confessions
from suspects is obvious in this situation. As such, the potential for
the abuse of a suspect's human rights is clear.
B. Treatment of Detained Criminal Suspects
1. Questioning.-Suspects must undergo intense questioning
by investigating officers who are under the direction of prosecutors
during the 23 day detention period following arrest. There are no
restrictions by which the police must abide during the interrogations
of suspects. Questioning in police holding cells may exceed ten hours
a day.56 During the detention period, judges have no authority to
interfere with the police and prosecutor's interrogations. Further, af-
fidavits containing the suspect's confession are crucial evidence at
trial, because of the traditional role of confessions in Japanese soci-
ety. In cases where the suspect refuses to confess or remains silent,
therefore, investigating officials apply maximum pressure.57 The ex-
ertion of such pressure by officials, combined with the culturally in-
grained expectation of confession,"8 has led to a serious problem of
coerced confessions. 59
2. Inability to Meet with Counsel.-During their 23 days of
police detention, suspects are typically frustrated by denials of access
to counsel. Investigators have complete control over the daily lives of
those in detention. Suspects are precluded from contact with attor-
neys and the rest of the outside world and are subjected to lengthy
interrogations designed to coerce confessions. As Lawrence Repeta
notes:
In a system in which more than 99 percent of persons tried
in formal proceedings are found guilty with the overwhelming
majority confessing at the first court hearing to crimes alleged,
it is during this initial interrogation period that most confessions
are obtained. During this period, the suspect is isolated from at-
torneys or any other person who may lend emotional support
and subjected to interrogations of a length and severity deter-
But in Japan, the arrest is the start of the investigation." Id.
56. JCLU Report, supra note 1, at 8.
57. Itoh, supra note 5, at 56.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
59. "Among a series of recent cases in which verdicts of not guilty were announced
following retrials of cases in which final death sentences had previously been rendered, the
cause of the initial erroneous verdict in both the Sumidagawa and Matsuyama cases was false
confession which had been coerced in police holding facilities." JCLU Report, supra note I, at
8.
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mined solely by the will of the interrogator. n
The practice of denying access to counsel is difficult to under-
stand in light of Article 34 of the Constitution of Japan which states:
"No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once in-
formed of the charges against him or without being granted the right
to retain the services of legal counsel." Further, Article 39(1) of the
Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure provides statutory language
which confirms the right of access to counsel provided in the Consti-
tution."' Article 39(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
statutory language which has been used by police and prosecutors in
practice, to circumvent the Constitutional guarantee of the right to
counsel. Article 39(3) states:
[Pirior to the institution of a public prosecution, a prosecutor,
clerk to a prosecutor, or judicial police official may, in cases
where it is necessary for the purpose of investigation, designate
the dates, places, and times for interviews and deliveries as de-
scribed in paragraph one of this article, provided, however, that
such designation shall not unfairly restrict the right of the sus-
pect to prepare his defense.62
Police and prosecutors have used Article 39(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to create a system of specific and general desig-
nations of counsel.6 3 Through the designation of counsel, suspects are
denied their right to have an attorney present during interrogations.
Under the system, visits, when permitted, are at the convenience of
investigating police and typically are very brief.64 The Japanese na-
tional bar association expressed great concern over this practice,
stating that despite the guarantee of free contact and communication
provided in the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure, in
actual practice, investigators continue to refuse suspects access to
counsel.6 5 The members of the bar association believe that the reason
investigating officials refuse access is because of their failure to re-
vise investigating techniques.6 6 Current investigators rely on pre-
60. Repeta, supra note 27, at 15.
61. Article 39(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: "A defendant or criminal
suspect in physical custody may, without any official being present, meet with his attorney, or
with a person who may become his attorney ... and may receive things or written materials
therefrom." CODE OF CRIM. PROC., supra note 39, at art 39(1).
62. CODE OF CRIM. PROC., supra note 39, at art. 39(3).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 137-42 for a detailed description of general and
specific designation of counsel systems. See also Tamiya, On The Designation of Communica-
tion With Counsel, 4 LAW IN JAPAN 87 (1970).
64. In most cases the attorney is permitted to visit for only fifteen minutes. Id. at 92; see
also Itoh, supra note 5, at 59.
65. Repeta, supra note 27, at 16-16 quoting JINKEN HAKUSITO (White Paper on
Human Rights) 119; (Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai ed., 1985) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER ON
HUMAN RIGHTS].
66. Id.
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World War II methods where the suspect is the sole object of the
investigation and no outside investigation is conducted by police and
prosecutors. During such investigations, the suspect is isolated from
the rest of the world, especially his attorney. Many commentators
have identified the denial of access to counsel as a source of false
confessions.6 7
3. No Bail System for Suspects in Detention.-Under the de-
tention system, suspects may not be released on bail prior to indict-
ment. The rationale used by government officials in rejecting a bail
system for detainees is that the 23 day detention period is too short
to justify such a system.6 8 While a 23 day detention period may be
reasonable in some situations, many times such a period may be un-
reasonable, especially when only a minor criminal offense is
involved.6 9
Typically, release from detention or release on bail (after indict-
ment) is refused if the suspect asserts his innocence or if the suspect
refuses to sign a detailed statement of the facts according to the
prosecution. 70 The Japanese national bar association stated in its
"White Paper on Human Rights,' that the prosecution abuses con-
finement in order to "serve the purposes of investigation and obtain
confessions. ' 72
4. Reported Abuses Under the Detention System.
a. The Tezuka case.73-The story of Chisako Tezuka provides
a recent example of abuse of a suspect while under police detention.
Ms. Tezuka was arrested on suspicion of fraudulently obtaining a
loan. She was taken to a police station for detention. At the station,
she was stripped naked, subjected twice to a genital search, and
forced to urinate while male police officers watched.7' Ms. Tezuka
was detained and questioned for 20 days. During her questioning,
she was handcuffed and roped around the waist. Tezuka was never
67. id.
68. ltoh, supra note 5, at 66.
69. Id.
70. Repeta, supra note 27, at 16.
71. WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 65, at 119.
72. Repeta, supra note 27, at 16, quoting WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
65, at 128-29.
73. Supra note 3, at col. 3.
74. Id. The police claim that Ms. Tezuka's account was inaccurate. Id. at col. 5. Mr.
Yasuhiro Maeda stated that abuses in police detention were the exception, not the rule. Id. at
col. 5. He stated that Ms. Tezuka was searched because the police thought that she might
commit suicide and because her behavior led them to believe that she was hiding something in
her sexual organs. Id. at col. 5-6. Recent books on the police detention system in Japan written
by former police officers, as well as testimony by former detainees, however, substantiate Ms.
Tezuka's claims. Id. at col. 6.
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indicted because the police found that she had paid back the loan
two months prior to her arrest. Ms. Tezuka claimed that the secrecy
of the detention system enabled police to treat her with "dehumaniz-
ing brutality." 5
b. Specific examples of denials of access to counsel.-During
the late 1960's and early 1970's, Japan was in a state of civil un-
rest. 76 This unrest was manifested in the form of student riots77 and
terrorist bombings. Access to counsel was consistently denied to
those suspected on involvement in the civil unrest. 8
An example of this denial of access to counsel can be found in
the Hideki Iwabochi 79 case. Iwabochi was indicated upon a charge of
attempting to bomb a police administration building. He was found
not guilty in his trial at first instance.80 Mr. Iwabochi described how
he was denied access to counsel as follows:
We could not request an interview; all we could do was
wait. In frame-ups like our case, a daily visit from the attorney
would decrease our anxiety and give us courage. Under the
threat that "your attorney will be arrested, too," we were lim-
ited to only two attorney's visits while we were held on the sepa-
rate charge of theft8 ' and two visits when we were held on the
main charge. Moreover, the length of time was absolutely inade-
quate. And a cop would stand outside with his ear to the wall of
the interviewing room to listen to the conversations with the at-
torney. The room where the interviews took place was a flimsy
structure and if you put your ear to the wall, you could overhear
the conversation within.8"
Denials of access to counsel have continued in all types of crimi-
nal cases in to the 1980's. The 1981 arrest of a university professor
provides another typical example.83 The professor was arrested under
75. Id. at col. 4.
76. See M. STANDISH & L. VILLALON, supra note 9, at 48-9.
77. In 1969, for example, police and students clashed on 1,500 separate occasions. Id. at
48.
78. Of course, those who were suspected of involvement in civil unrest were not the only
suspects who were denied access to counsel; they received the most publicity because their
cases were of great national interest. See also Itoh, supra note 5, at 60-1.
79. See Itoh, supra note 5, at 60.
80. This is a practice commonly used by Japanese prosecutors, it is known as "bekken
taiho" or "arrest on a separate charge." Id. at 60, n.*. It provides the prosecutor with the
ability to extend the period in which he may hold the suspect in detention. Id. In the Iwabochi
case, the suspect was arrested first for theft, but he was questioned during his initial detention
period about a series of bombing incidents. Following the lapse of the initial 23 day detention
period, the suspect was rearrested and charged with the bombing of the police administration
building. Id. This action gave the police an additional 23 days to interrogate the suspect and to
deny the suspect's access to counsel. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Rapeta, supra note 27, at 18 n.55.
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suspicion of accepting a bribe. The Special Investigations Division of
the Tokyo District Prosecutors Office handled the investigation. The
professor's attorney was one of the most well-known lawyer in Japan.
Two days after arrest, the attorney sought access to the suspect for
the first time.84 At first, he was denied a meeting and was told to
come back in three days. The attorney demanded a meeting immedi-
ately and was finally permitted to meet with the suspect for twenty
minutes. 85 During the suspect's sixteen days of detention before in-
dictment, his attorney was permitted to meet with him seven times
for a cumulative total of three hours.8 6 Each time the attorney went
to meet with the professor, his initial request was denied and he was
forced to argue in order to gain access to his client.
The attorney maintained a record of the length of interrogation
and methods used by the prosecution on his client. During the six-
teen day period of interrogation, the prosecutors had questioned the
professor for 141 hours and 31 minutes (an average of 8 hours and
50 minutes a day).8 7 The prosecution's interrogation methods in-
cluded continuously shouted demands that the suspect confess. When
the suspect refused, the prosecutor "sat on the edge of the table and
thrust a ballpoint pen immediately in front of the suspect's eye. Then
he would move the pen in a circle, while ordering the suspect to stare
at the tip of the pen." 8 When the suspect still refused to confess, the
prosecutor screamed that he was a liar, kicked the chair out from
under him, and made him stand facing the wall.
Finally, the suspect signed his chosko, or suspect's statement,
which is a fact statement prepared by the prosecutor, or in effect, a
confession. At trial, the attorney presented evidence of the interroga-
tion methods used by the prosecution in an effort to show that his
client's confession was involuntary. The judge accepted the attor-
ney's evidence, but ruled that the interrogation methods of the prose-
cutor were lawful, and therefore the confession was voluntary.8 9
c. Other examples of abuses under the police detention sys-
tem.-In June of 1988, the Japanese Civil Liberties Union published
a report listing other serious abuses which regularly take place under
the police detention system.9" The report states that the continued
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. The interrogations not only lasted for almost nine hours a day, they typically contin-
ued past 10 p.m. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 19, n.55. "This case involved both elite prosecutors of the Tokyo Special In-
vestigations unit and one of the country's most reputed attorneys. Id. [in a similar situation]
where such prominent members of the legal profession are not involved, the interrogation tech-
niques may be much more extreme." Id.
90. See JCLU Report, supra note I, at 8-9.
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abuse of suspects has lead to many cases of false confessions and
erroneous judgments.91 First, as the report notes, a major cause of
false confessions is because of the bartering of "privileges," such as
food and meetings with family members in exchange for confes-
sions.9" For example, if the suspect refuses to confess, he may be
subjected to restrictions on drinking water and visits to toilet
facilities.93
The second cause of false confessions listed in the JCLU Report
is of major importance. The report notes that many false confessions
are obtained because interrogators utilize violence against suspects in
an effort to force confessions.94 Because police detention or interro-
gation cells are enclosed compartments which are inaccessible to
third parties, incidents of violence occur against suspects. The fol-
lowing is a sampling of the numerous examples of violence and coer-
cion that have been reported:
(1) Pain is inflicted on suspects by squeezing their fingers
together while pencils are inserted between the fingers."
(2) Suspects are questioned with high-powered lamps con-
tinuously trained on their faces.
(3) Threats are made that family members will be arrested
unless the suspect confesses."
IV. Relevance of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights97 to Human Rights Questions in Japan
A. Beginnings of the "Human Rights Revolution"
With the end of World War II came two important develop-
ments regarding human rights in Japan. The first development was
the establishment of a democratic government through the 1947
Constitution of Japan. The 1947 Constitution provided for a demo-
91. Id.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. This technique is used because it is a means of inflicting pain without leaving any
scars. Telephone interview with Lawrence Repeta, Esquire (Oct. I1, 1988).
The basis of this paper is to attempt to point out some basic human rights violations
which have taken place under the Japanese police detention system. Unfortunately, the specific
topic of torture under the police detention system will not be addressed. It should be noted,
however, that Japan is subject to numerous United Nations Declarations regarding torture,
and has signed the United Nations' UNILATERAL DECLARATION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, G.A. Res. 3452
(XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34-A/10034) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10408 (1975). For a
discussion of torture and the treatment of prisoners see, N. RODLEY. THE TREATMENT OF PRIS-
ONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE
EIGHTIES (1984).
96. JCLU Report, supra note 1, at 9.
97. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 170.1-180.1.
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cratic form of government and guaranteed the citizens of Japan fun-
damental human rights.98
The second development was the adoption of the United Na-
tions Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights99 in
1948. Before World War II, international law did not regulate the
manner in which countries treated their own citizens.100 With the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "this pre-war system com-
posed solely of insular legal systems each confined within the bound-
aries of a single nation-state has been replaced by a new interna-
tional order."' 01
This new international order has been formed by multinational
human rights treaties which have followed the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.102 These treaties permit citizens who have "griev-
ances against their own government to have access to universal prin-
ciples of human rights embodied within these multi-national declara-
tions and agreements. °10 3
B. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in
Japan
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was ratified by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966.104
The Covenant contained an Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1 0 5 The Japanese government
ratified the Covenant on June 21, 1979; on September 21, 1979 it
became effective.10 6 Japan did not, however, ratify the Optional Pro-
98. The Constitution of Japan guarantees fundamental human rights, but there is
neither a listing of exactly what those rights are or "Bill of Rights" amendments as set forth in
the United States Constitution.
99. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc. A/
810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL DECLARATION], reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note
8, at 440.1
100. For a discussion of how international law was changed to deal with nations that
deny human rights to their own citizens, see Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law
and Institutions: Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REV. I (1988) [hereinafter
Buergenthal].
101. Repeta, supra note 27, at I.
102.
The Universal Declaration is not a treaty. It was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in the form of a resolution that has no force of law,
and it was not intended by the assembly to create binding legal obligations
.... Time, however, transformed the normative status of the Universal Decla-
ration. Today few international lawyers would deny that the Universal Declara-
tion imposes some international legal obligations.
Buergenthal, supra note 100, at 8.
103. Repeta, supra note 27, at I.
104. See supra note 8.
105. OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITI-
CAL RIGHTS G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 8, at 370.1.
106. For a general discussion of the effect of the Covenant on Japanese law, see
Kawashima, The International Covenants on Human Right and the Japanese Legal System,
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tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
"The Covenant was designed to transform the general principles
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration into binding treaty obliga-
tions. '"107 Unlike the procedure under the Universal Declaration,
once a state becomes a party to the Covenant, it is under an immedi-
ate legal obligation to comply with provisions of the Covenant." 8
The provisions of the Covenant are implemented by a body known as
the Human Rights Committee through a reporting and complaint
procedure.10 9
Thus, Japanese human rights activists believe that the ratifica-
tion of the Covenant was a momentous occasion for the protection of
human rights. Activists see the Covenant as a measuring stick from
which they can objectively gauge the performance of their govern-
ment on human rights issues. 10 Further, "it provides a concrete set
of legal obligations which observers outside Japan can cite when con-
fronting the always delicate task of criticizing the actions of a for-
eign sovereign within its own territory.111
C. Status of the Covenant in Japan
The Covenant's vast potential has been essentially untested in
Japanese law thus far."' Although the Human Rights Commission
of the United Nations has examined complaints concerning discrimi-
nation against Koreans in Japan, the Human Rights Commission
does not appear ready to play an important role in preventing Japa-
nese human rights violations in the near future. 1 3 The inability of
the Human Rights Commission to play a more significant role stems
from the failure of the Japanese government to make a declaration
under Article 41 of the Covenant11 and from their failure to ratify
the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.115 Either of these treaties
would permit the Human Rights Commission to hear complaints
from individuals." 6
In terms of national enforcement, the Japanese judiciary has yet
to consider the Covenant in reaching a decision." 7 Most litigants
22 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 54.
107. Buergenthal, supra note 100, at 10.
108. Id. at 12.
109. Id.
110. Repeta, supra note 27, at 3.
III. Id.
112. See generally Repeta, supra note 27; see also Itoh, supra note 5.
113. Repeta, supra note 27, at 3.
114. Id. at 3, n.8.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Article 41 of the Covenant states:
A State Party to the Present Covenant may at any time declare that it
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communi-
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make "perfunctory reference" '118 to the Covenant in their complaints.
Japanese judges, however, "tend to hold an extremely broad view of
administrative discretion and a rather limited view of their own au-
thority to order change." 1 9 As such, Japanese judges make court
enforcement of the Covenant "merely illusory."20
There are two techniques for enforcement, however, which ap-
pear promising. The first is the use of heavy media campaigns, which
draws international attention to human rights problems, and forces
changes in policy. Such appeals to international opinion have had a
positive impact on human rights concerns in Japan in the past. 21
The second technique for enforcement of the Covenant is
through the Constitution of Japan. Article 98(2) of the Constitution
of Japan states: "Treaties concluded by Japan and established laws
of nations shall be faithfully observed."' 22 Thus, Article 98(2) of the
Constitution can be viewed as not only incorporating treaties into
Japanese law, but also incorporating customary international law as
well. The view that customary international law has the force of law
in Japan has been accepted by the majority of Japanese constitu-
tional scholars.12 3 If this view is correct, then Japanese judges should
be unable to disregard precedents from abroad. Thus, since the Eu-
ropean Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights have been interpreting the 1950 European convention
on Human Rights, which contains provisions parallel to those in the
Covenant, these decisions should influence the decisions of Japanese
cations to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not
fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this
article may be received and considered only if submitted by a State Party which
has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the
Committee ....
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 170.11. Japan has not made a
declaration under Article 41 which would recognize the competence of the Human Rights
Committee to receive complaints from individuals. Repeta, supra note 27, at 3 n.8. Japan has
not ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which would also permit the Human Rights Committee to hear complaints from individuals.
Id.
118. Id. at 3.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 3. As Professor Buergenthal notes: "The international condemnations and
pressure to which recalcitrant governments are increasingly being subjected tend to have a
prophylactic and ameliorative effect. Buergenthal, supra note 100, at 4-5, quoted in Repeta,
supra note 27, at 4 n.9.
As governments come to realize that they must pay a higher political price for violating
their international human rights obligations, the world's human rights situation cannot but
improve." Id.
122. KENPO (Constitution) art. 98, para. 2 (Japan).
123. Professor Iwasawa states: "A majority of scholars interpret Article 98(2) of the
Constitution as incorporating into Japanese law not only treaties but customary international
law as well. The view that customary international law has the force of law in Japan is widely
accepted." Y. IWASAWA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF KOREANS IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON JAPANESE LAW (International Human Rights Law
Group, Aug. 1986), quoted in Repeta, supra note 27, at 5.
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courts.12 Although the use of foreign precedents in Japanese courts
would constitute a fundamental change in the Japanese system, it
would give the Covenant the proper emphasis afforded to it as a
treaty under the Japanese Constitution.
V. Application of the Covenant to Specific Human Rights
Problems Presented By the Japanese Police Detention System
A. The Use of Alternative Detention Facilities is in Violation of
the Covenant
1. The Use of Police Stations for Extended Detentions Vio-
lates Article 9 of the Covenant.-Detention of suspects in police de-
tention cells violates two fundamental principles addressed in Article
9 of the Covenant.' 25 First, it violates the right to be informed of
reasons for arrest within a reasonable time. Second, it denies an indi-
vidual the right to be placed under judicial authority following
arrest.
a. Right to be informed of the reasons for arrest.-Article
9(2) of the Covenant 2 ' states: "Anyone who is arrested shall be in-
formed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall
be promptly informed of any charge against him.112 7 The police de-
tention system provides no method of informing suspects of the rea-
sons for their arrest and detention. Only upon indictment, possibly
23 days after arrest, are suspects informed of the formal charges
against them. 2 Thus, since the suspects do not know the formal
charges against them during their detention period, it is almost im-
possible to prepare defenses. Further, even if suspects were aware of
the charges, their incarceration deprives them of a critical time pe-
riod during which to prepare their defenses.
124.
[tlhe 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. . .contains provisions
parallel to those in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Two special insti-
tutions, the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights, have developed considerable jurisprudence with respect to the
European Convention. There are almost daily press releases about cases submit-
ted or decided. In Europe, international decisions on human rights are no longer
extraordinary occurrences.
This European jurisprudence throws light not only on the provisions of the
European Convention, but also on the similar provisions in the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U.L. REV., quoted in Repeta, supra note 27, at 6.
125. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 170.1.
126. Id. at 170.4.
127. See id.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 32-41.
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b. Right of suspects to be placed under the supervision of the
judiciary.-Currently, under the Japanese police detention system, if
the prosecutor decides to detain a suspect, he must submit a request
for detention to a judge within 72 hours of the suspect's arrest.129
Once the request is granted, the suspect is said to be under the su-
pervision of the judiciary. In nearly all cases, however, the judge
fails to exercise judicial power over the suspect. The judge merely
functions as a "rubber stamp" of the prosecutor's desire to detain
the suspect under police supervision rather than in one of the 113
detention centers. 130 The lack of judicial supervision over suspects
who are detained violates Article 9(3) of the Covenant, which states:
"Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exer-
cise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable
time or to release.' ' 31
2. Detention of Suspects under Police Authority Facilitates
Coercion of Confessions Prohibited by Article 14 of the Cove-
nant.' 32-Article 14(3)(g) states: "In the determination of any crim-
inal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following
minimum guarantees, in full equality: . . . (g) Not to be compelled
to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 1 33
The Japanese police detention system is in violation of Article
14(3)(g), because the purpose of the system is admittedly to coerce
confessions from suspects. 3 Police and prosecutors are no doubt
tempted to coerce confessions from suspects who are held in their
authority. In the past, investigators have used various methods to
coerce confessions from suspects. 35 One method which is especially
notorious is the use or threat of violence. Not only does the use or
threat of violence violate Article 14(3)(g) of the Covenant, it also
violates Article 7, which prohibits the use of torturous, cruel or de-
129. Id.
130. Repeta, supra note 27, at 23-24. See also JCLU Report, supra note 1, at 9.
131. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 170.4.
132. Id. at 170.5.
133. Id.
134. "Investigating officials publicly assert that the purpose of detention is to force the
suspect to confess." Itoh, supra note 5, at 60, quoting Kato, Sekken Kotsu to Sosa (Contacts
with criminal suspects and the investigation), KEISATsu GAKURONSHU (No. 9).
135. To coerce confessions police have:
1) used extended questioning sessions, see supra text accompanying notes 73-
89.
2) bartered with suspects for privileges, see supra text accompanying notes 90-
93.
3) used violence and threats of violence, see supra text accompanying notes 94-
96, or other inhuman or degrading treatment, see also text accompanying notes
73-75.
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grading treatment or punishment."'
B. Designation of Counsel is in Violation of the Covenant
1. The Designation System.' 37-The designation system is the
method utilized by prosecutors to deny contact between attorneys
and criminal suspects in detention. Under the designation system,
the police and prosecutors have sole discretion in determining
whether a suspect will have access to counsel. The Japanese judici-
ary is completely detached from the decision-making process.
When the prosecutor chooses to permit an attorney to visit a
criminal suspect, the prosecutor fills out a Number 48 Form 3 8 (the
"general designation form"), and he provides a copy of this form to
the suspect and to the chief of the police station where the suspect is
held.139 When the attorney requests to visit the suspect, and the
prosecutor permits a visit, the prosecutor fills out a Form Number 49
(the "specific designation form" or "interview ticket") upon which
the prosecutor specifies the time and date of the interview. The pros-
ecutor then makes a request for the attorney to come to prosecutor's
office to pick up the document.140
When the Number 48 general designation form is issued to the
police chief, the attorney's visit is denied unless he has the Number
49 specific designation form (or interview ticket) with him. Thus, the
rule is that where a Number 48 general designation form is issued,
visits with counsel only become possible with the issuance of Num-
ber 49 specific designation forms. " Thus, the general rule is prohi-
bition of visits; allowance of visits constitutes the exception. 4 '
2. Impact of the Designation System on Criminal Sus-
pects.-Use of a designation system has a significant impact on
criminal suspects and their ability to prepare a defense. The system
of designations is used by police and prosecutors to deny suspects
access to their attorneys so that they might elicit confessions from
the uninformed suspects. Additionally, the system severely restricts
the dates and times of visits that an attorney may have with the
suspect. Investigating officers have also developed numerous excuses
136. Article 7 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment." COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note
8, at 170.3.
137. See generally supra text accompanying notes 60-67; see also text accompanying
notes 73-75.
138. This form is to be prepared pursuant to Article 28 of the Ministry of Justice Order
of Regulations for the Processing of Cases. Itoh, supra note 5, at 57.
139. Recently, prosecutors and police have chosen not to give the Number 48 Form to
suspects. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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to deny specific designations further limiting the number of visits. 43
Not only are the dates, time and number of visits severely re-
stricted, but when a visit with an attorney is granted, it is extremely
short. In most cases, the duration of a visit is limited to fifteen min-
utes. 1 4 With so little time, all an attorney can do is exchange greet-
ings, take messages to be given to the suspect's family, and explain
the suspect's basic rights. There is certainly not enough time to dis-
cuss the intricacies of the suspect's case. Accordingly, it is nearly
impossible to prepare a defense for the suspect.
3. Denials of Access to Counsel through the Designation Sys-
tem Violates the Covenant.-Article 14(3) of the Covenant states:
"In the determination of any criminal charges against them, every-
one shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full
equity: . . . (b) To have adequate facilities for preparation of his
defense and to communicate with counsel of his choosing." 4 5
Article 14 makes no reference to restrictions upon the right of a
suspect to contact his attorney. The absence of such a references
does not mean that countries are free to restrict the suspect's access
to counsel, but rather it establishes a general principles that no re-
strictions on the access to counsel may be established. "" This gen-
eral principles is defined further by the Third Subcommittee of the
Twelfth International Criminal Law Conference (A.I.D.P.)." The
Subcommittee states that access to counsel may be restricted only
when: (1) ordered by a judicial officer, and (2) restriction is an indis-
pensable means necessary to maintain security. 48
The designation system currently used in Japan today violates
143. The reasons given to refuse specific designations include:
1). the suspect is being moved to a distant prosecutor's office for investigation;
2) conditions of the interrogation or other investigation will not allow an inter-
view; 3) the time is outside the regularly scheduled hours for operation of the
government office involved; 4) the prosecutor in charge is not present and there-
fore a specific designation cannot be issued; 5) there has already been sufficient
opportunity for interviews between attorney and suspect, so there is no need for
additional interviews.
Id. at 58.
144. Id. at 59. See also Tamiya, supra note 63, at 92.
145. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 170.5.
146. Itoh, supra note 5, at 61.
147. The Third Subcommittee of the Twelfth International Criminal Law Conference
stated in Article 6 of the Resolutions of the Conference, that:
6. All persons accused of crime shall be able to prepare a defense and to re-
ceive the assistance of a qualified attorney at all stages of the criminal justice
process and shall be informed of the foregoing . . . . (c) Attorneys shall be al-
lowed to be present at all significant stages of the proceedings . . . . (e) All
persons placed in physical custody shall have the right to meet and communicate
privately with attorneys. Restrictions on this right shall be allowed only when
ordered by a judicial officer as an indispensable means necessary to maintain
security.
Id. at 61-62.
148. Itoh, supra note 5, at 61-62.
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both Article 14(3)(b) of the Covenant and Article 34 of the Japa-
nese Constitution' 49 which provide for the right of a criminal suspect
to have free access to his attorney. The Covenant and the Constitu-
tion are violated in several respects. First, the official with the au-
thority to place restrictions on access to counsel is not a judicial of-
ficer, but rather the prosecutor who is also in charge of the
investigation of the suspect. Second, denials of counsel are rarely
made to maintain security as required by the Covenant. The reason
most often given for restriction, "the needs of the investigation," is
extremely vague and subject to an overly broad interpretation. 5
The designation system is unfair to suspects for four reasons.
First, during the initial period of detention, the suspect is isolated
from counsel who could provide him with moral and emotional sup-
port. Second, the inability to meet with counsel during detention se-
verely restricts the suspect's ability to gather evidence and establish
a defense. Third, the presence of an attorney would put an end to
efforts by over zealous prosecutors and police who try to coerce con-
fessions from suspects. Fourth, and most importantly, since an attor-
ney is not permitted to be present during the interrogation of the
suspect, the attorney is unable to apprise the suspect of his legal
rights and obligations.
C. Lack of a Bail System for Suspects Violates Article 9(3) of the
Covenant
No bail system exists for suspects under the police detention
system prior to indictment. This violates Article 9(3) of the Cove-
nant which generally states that persons awaiting trial may not be
detained in custody.1 51 Article 9(3) applies to criminal suspects prior
to indictment as well as thereafter.1 5 The prosecutor's rationale for
the denial of bail to detainees in Japan is that 23 days is too brief a
period of time to grant bail.' 53 In the case of a minor criminal in-
fraction, however, a 23-day deprivation of liberty is excessive. More-
over, lack of a bail system prior to indictment places the suspect at a
disadvantage if his case goes to trial because the detained suspect
149. Article 34 of the Constitution of Japan states:
No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of
the charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall
he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any person such
cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence and the presence
of his counsel.
KENPO art. .34.
150. Itoh, supra note 5, at 63.
151. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 170.4; see also
supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
153. Itoh, supra note 5, at 66.
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has had no opportunity to gain access to evidence which may clear
him of guilt.' 5 '
VI. A Proposal for Change
A. Decisions of the Japanese Courts Must Accord Precedential
Value to International Courts Interpreting the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights
Presently, the Japanese courts have an extremely expansive view
of administrative discretion. This view is evident in the broad discre-
tion afforded to prosecutors in the Japanese criminal justice system.
The prosecution in Japan has increasingly gained power to decide
the innocence or guilt of suspects.' 55 "Rights of access to counsel and
release on bail and the right not to testify against oneself have been
virtually extinguished." 115  This elimination of fundamental rights
could not have occurred without acquiescence by the courts. 57
While Japanese courts afford wide administrative discretion,
they have a limited view of their own ability to promote change. If
Japanese law granted recognition to international customary law,'
Japanese courts would be forced to "take off their blinders" and ac-
knowledge the fundamental rights within the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.159 The importance of the Covenant may not only be
found through the substantive fundamental rights it lists, °60 but it
may also provide an entrance for decisions from international
courts' which grant greater protection to those substantive funda-
mental rights. If the decisions of the international courts interpreting
the Covenant were given precedential value in Japan, human rights
litigants could regularly cite the decisions of these courts. As such,
international law would not remain a lifeless statement of principles
154. Repeta, supra note 27, at 17.
155. Id. at 23.
156. Id.
157. Id.
Formal authority to decide whether a suspect may be detained beyond sev-
enty-two hours resides with the judge. The same is true of the authority to de-
cide whether to grant bail requests and what the amount of bail is to be. A judge
must also decide whether to issue warrants for searches and seizures and
whether evidence obtained by the police and prosecutors-whether in the form
of confessions obtained during lengthy interrogations or physical evidence gath-
ered during searches or otherwise-may be accepted and deemed reliable in that
court. In all these areas, it appears that the judiciary has granted the govern-
ment a carte blanche.
Id. at 23-24.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 112-24.
159. Many of the rights listed in the Covenant have been previously enumerated in the
Constitution of Japan. Repeta, supra note 27, at 23-24.
160. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 170.1.
161. Among these international courts are the European Court of Human Rights and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Repeta, supra note 27, at 27.
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but could be used as a tool to combat injustice in concrete cases. 162
VII. Conclusion
The Japanese criminal justice system should be both compli-
mented and condemned. The system should be praised for producing
one of the lowest crime rates in the world. The Japanese people
should be commended, too, for creating a society in which morals
and social controls still play a significant part in curtailing crime.
The Japanese criminal justice system should be condemned, how-
ever, for the denial of fundamental human rights which occurs to
suspects under the police detention system. The police detention sys-
tem clearly conflicts with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights as well as the Constitution of Japan. The system also
exploits the social controls that are so important to Japanese society,
not only threatening the guilty, but the innocent as well. Hope for
change comes from the Japanese Judiciary which has acquiesced to
administrative authority in the past. The Japanese courts now have
the opportunity, through the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
to effectuate change and prevent the human rights abuses inherent in
the police detention system.
Christopher James Neumann
162. Id.
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